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Abstract
In the theoretical assumption of informational cascades, private signals and predecessors'
actions are equivalently informative before informational cascades, but are not once
informational cascades have started. This experimental study tests this assumption by
measuring the informativeness of private signals and predecessors' actions for human
subjects in and out of informational cascades. We observed that subjects in informational
cascades do not extract much information from predecessors' actions, indicating that they
recognize other subjects' cascading behaviors, that subjects rely more on their private signals
than on predecessors' actions even when both of them are equivalently informative, and that
subjects cannot estimate posterior beliefs precisely in a Bayesian way due to cognitive biases
such as anchoring and adjustment or conservatism.
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Suppose a situation where individuals observe informative but noisy private signals for an
underlying state and choose an appropriate action for that state one by one in sequence.
If individuals’ actions are publicly observable, successors can infer their predecessors’ pri-
vate signals. These publicly inferred signals are aggregated as the decision-making process
goes on. When an individual’s private signal does not correspond to the aggregated pub-
licly inferred signals, rational individuals may ignore it and follow the action the majority
of predecessors have chosen. Informational cascades, formulated by Bikhchandani, Hir-
shleifer, and Welch (1992) (hereafter BHW), are said to occur if all the individuals in a
society choose an identical action irrespective of their private signals as a consequence of
rational Bayesian belief updating
In the BHW theory, individuals are supposed to update their posterior beliefs in a
Bayesian way before informational cascades, but they are supposed not to update once
informational cascades have started. This behavioral hypothesis is implicitly based on
the assumption that private signals and predecessors’ actions are equivalently informative
before informational cascades, but are not once informational cascades have started.
In informational cascades, private signals always reﬂect the underlying state, whereas
predecessors’ actions convey no information about the underlying state because they
may not reﬂect predecessors’ private signals.
The primary objective of this experimental study is to test the assumption above
by measuring the informativeness of private signals and predecessors’ actions for human
subjects. To do that, we implement scoring rules on a one-person cascades treatment
where subjects observe only private signals, and on a six-person cascades treatment where
subjects observe only predecessors’ actions. Then, we examine their belief updating
behaviors in the two diﬀerent treatments1.
From the experimental results, we observed that subjects in informational cascades do
not extract much information from predecessors’ actions, indicating that they recognize
other subjects’ cascading behaviors, that subjects rely more on their private signals than
on predecessors’ actions even when both of them are equivalently informative, and that
subjects cannot estimate posterior beliefs precisely in a Bayesian way due to cognitive
biases such as anchoring and adjustment or conservatism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ex-
perimental design and procedure, Section 3 proposes behavioral assumptions, Section 4
reports the results, and the ﬁnal section discusses them.
2 Design and procedure
2.1 The prediction game
There are two states of the world ω = {A, B}. Each state is realized with the commonly
known priors Pr(A)=p =1 /2, and Pr(B)=1− p =1 /2. Subjects do not know which
1There have been many experimental studies on informational cascades. Most of them have exam-
ined whether informational cascades actually occur in the laboratory as the BHW theory predicts (e.g.
Anderson and Holt (1997)). A few studies have investigated subjects’ belief updating behaviors by using
scoring rules (Dominitz and Hung (2004)) or by using the BDM mechanism (Stiehler (2003)). However,
to our knowledge, there has been no study which directly analyzes each informativeness of private signals
and predecessors’ actions.
1state would be realized. However, they can infer the realized state by making use of two
types of information, private signals σω and predecessors’ predictions πω in each of six
stages in one round.
Private signals can be observed by drawing one ball from an urn with replacement.
There are two urns, A and B. Each urn contains white or red balls, which represent
state A and state B, respectively. If state A has been realized, subjects draw one ball
from urn A which contains two white balls and one red ball, and if state B has been
realized, subjects draw one ball from urn B, which contains two red balls and one white
ball. Thus, the posterior probability that the ball drawn indicates the correct state is
Pr(A|σA)=0 .67 and Pr(B|σB)=0 .67.
In addition to private signals, subjects may observe all predictions made by their
predecessors; subjects in stage t can observe t−1 predictions made by their predecessors.
The main role of the subjects in this experiment is to submit predictions and beliefs
about which state would be realized with what probability in the following two diﬀerent
treatments.
2.2 Treatments
2.2.1 One-person cascades treatment
In the one-person cascades treatment (1-CAS), the prediction game is played by only one
player. Since subjects in 1-CAS do not interact with other subjects, they cannot observe
predecessors’ predictions. Instead, they can observe one independent private signal in
each of six stages per round. After observing one private signal, they are requested to
submit both predictions and beliefs.
2.2.2 Six-person cascades treatment
I nt h es i x - p e r s o nc a s c a d e st r e a t m e n t( 6 - C A S ) ,t h ep r e d i c t i o ng a m ei sp l a y e db yag r o u po f
six subjects in an exogenously determined order. When subjects in stage t are requested
to submit both predictions and beliefs, they can observe t − 1 predecessors’ predictions
and one private signal. We name the stages where subjects submit both predictions and
beliefs as decision stages. A decision stage is assigned to each subject once per round
and the prediction submitted in a decision stage is announced publicly to the other ﬁve
subjects of the same group. Subjects who do not submit predictions in stage t cannot
observe private signals but observe t−1 predecessors’ predictions. They are requested to
submit beliefs after observing t−1 predecessors’ predictions. We name such stages where
subjects submit only beliefs as nondecision stages. Nondecision stages are assigned to
each subject ﬁve times per round and the beliefs reported in nondecision stages are not
announced to the other subjects2.
2.3 Payoﬀs
Payoﬀs to the subjects consist of prediction points and belief points.
In 1-CAS, subjects receive the prediction point = Y50 if they have submitted the correct
prediction in the stage which is randomly chosen by the computer among six stages per
2Whereas a sequence of decision stages corresponds to the ordinary structure of informational cascades
experiments (e.g., Anderson and Holt (1997)), our experimental design requires subjects who are not in
the decision stage to report their beliefs.
2round. In 6-CAS, subjects receive the prediction point = Y50 if they have submitted the
correct prediction in the decision stage.
For belief points, we use the incentive compatible ’scoring rule’ as in Nyarko and
Schotter (2002) and Dominitz and Hung (2004). Speciﬁcally, subject i is requested to
report the probability that he/she thinks state A would be realized μi(A) and the prob-
ability that he/she thinks state B would be realized μi(B)3. If state A is realized in that
round, the belief point to subject i is
= Y15(2 − [(1 − μi(A))
2 +( μi(B))
2]), (1)
and if state B is realized in that round, the belief point to subject i is
= Y15(2 − [(μi(A))
2 +( 1− μi(B))
2]). (2)
3 Behavioral assumptions
We compare subjects’ belief updating behaviors in the situation where subjects observe
only private signals and in the situation where subjects observe only predecessors’ pre-
dictions. To do that, we restrict our analysis to their posterior beliefs reported in stages
1—5 of 1-CAS and those reported in nondecision stages 2—6 of 6-CAS. Note that subjects
in stage t of 1-CAS observe t private signals and those in the nondecision stage t +1of
6-CAS observe the same number of t predecessors’ predictions.
In 1-CAS, subjects observe only private signals. Since private signals always reﬂect
the realized state, subjects can update their posterior beliefs in a Bayesian way. Thus,
informational cascades cannot occur.
In the nondecision stage of 6-CAS, subjects observe only predecessors’ predictions. If
they observe at least three agreeing predecessors’ predictions consecutively, they would




B)=0 .67, for example. In such a situation where informational cascades
may have occurred, subjects in nondecision stage of 6-CAS cannot update posterior beliefs
in a Bayesian way because newly added predecessors’ predictions convey no information
about the realized state. Once informational cascades have occurred, posterior beliefs
of subjects in nondecision stage t +1would be Pr(A|π1
A,π2
A,...,πt
A) ∈ [0.67,0.89] if the
most recently observed predecessor’s prediction is same as the formerly agreeing ones4.




0.67 if the most recently observed predecessor’s prediction is diﬀerent from the formerly
agreeing ones5.
We name stages where informational cascades would not occur in 6-CAS as no-
cascades stages and those where informational cascades would occur in 6-CAS as cascades
stages.
3Subjects are instructed that the sum of μi(A) and μi(B) should be 1. The computer program does
not accept a belief pair that does not sum to 1.
4This is because the subjects in decision stage t observe either σt
A or σt
B.
5Obviously, in informational cascades, reporting the diﬀerent predictions from the formerly agreeing
ones in decision stage is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, we do not exclude such cases and
examine subjects’ posterior beliefs after observing predecessors’ oﬀ-the-equilibrium path predictions. We
assume that subjects in decision stage would report oﬀ-the-equilibrium path predictions if and only if
they observe diﬀerent private signals from the formerly agreeing predictions.
3In no-cascades stages, since private signals and predecessors’ predictions are equiv-
alently informative, subjects in 1-CAS and in 6-CAS can update posterior belief in a
Bayesian way. Thus, they would report exactly the same posterior beliefs if the sequences
of the observed private signals/predecessors’ predictions are the same. In cascades stages,
since private signals are informative, but predecessors’ predictions are not informative,
subjects in 1-CAS can update posterior beliefs in a Bayesian way, whereas those who in
6 - C A Sc a n n o t . T h u s ,p o s t e r i o rb e l i e f sr e p o r t e di n1 - C A Sw o u l db eh i g h e rt h a nt h o s e
reported in 6-CAS even if the sequences of the observed private signals/predecessors’
predictions are the same.
To summarize the discussion above, we provide the following hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: In 1-CAS, subjects update their posterior beliefs in no-cascades stages
and cascades stages in a Bayesian way.
• Hypothesis 2: In 6-CAS, subjects update their posterior beliefs in no-cascades stages
in a Bayesian way, but do not update their beliefs in cascades stages.
• Hypothesis 3: In cascades stages, subjects’ posterior beliefs reported in 1-CAS are
higher than those reported in 6-CAS. However, in no-cascades stages, subjects’
posterior beliefs reported in 1-CAS and those reported in 6-CAS are the same if the
sequence of the observed private signals or predecessors’ predictions is the same.
4R e s u l t s
Thirty undergraduate students from Future University-Hakodate and thirty undergrad-
uate and graduate students from Osaka University participated in the experiment. They
played the prediction game for six rounds in each of the 6-CAS and 1-CAS treatments.
Each experimental session took less than 100 minutes including instructions and pay-
ment. Average payment was = Y3220 including a show-up fee. The whole experimental
procedure was programmed and implemented by z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)).
For presenting results, we categorize all stages into no-cascades stages 1-3 and cas-
cades stages 1-3 by the hypothetical posterior probabilities we assumed in the preceding
section6. Table 1 provides subjects’ average posterior beliefs reported in no-cascades
stages along with the hypothetical posterior probabilities given the sequences of observed
private signals/predecessors’ predictions. Table 2 provides those reported in cascades
stages when the most recently observed private signals/predecessor’s prediction is same
as the formerly agreeing ones, whereas Table 3 provides those reported in cascades stages
when the most recently observed private signals/predecessor’s prediction is diﬀerent from
the formerly agreeing ones.
They are also displayed graphically in Figures 1-4. Note that the vertical axes rep-
resent the posterior belief that one of the states would be realized and the horizontal
axes represent each stage. Note also that bold lines represent subjects’ average posterior
beliefs and dotted lines represent the hypothetical posterior probabilities.
6Because of the symmetric signal conﬁguration, we can regard the posterior beliefs for state A reported
in each stage given a sequence of private signals/predecessors’ predictions as equal to those for state B
given its complementary sequence.
44.1 Belief updating behaviors
Table 4 reports the Spearman’s rank correlation tests. In 1-CAS, we can reject the
null hypothesis of no correlation between subjects’ posterior beliefs and the sequences
of observed private signals/predecessors’ predictions in no-cascades stages and cascades
stages. In 6-CAS, we can reject the null hypothesis in no-cascades stages, whereas we
cannot reject it in cascades stages. We argue that subjects’ posterior beliefs increase as
the agreeing private signals increase in no-cascades stages and cascades stages of 1-CAS.
They also increase as the agreeing predecessors’ predictions increase in no-cascades stages
of 6-CAS, but they do not increase as the agreeing predecessors’ predictions increase in
cascades stages of 6-CAS. Since increases of posterior belief would reﬂect subjects’ belief
updating, we derive the following results.
• Result 1: In 1-CAS, subjects update their posterior beliefs in both no-cascades
stages and cascades stages.
• Result 2: In 6-CAS, subjects update their posterior beliefs in no-cascades stages,
but do not update their beliefs in cascades stages.
4.2 Informativeness of private signals and predecessors’ predic-
tions
Tables 5 and 6 report the Mann-Whitney test of diﬀerence in the posterior beliefs reported
in each stage of 1-CAS and 6-CAS. For the beliefs when the most recently observed private
signal/predecessor’s prediction is same as the formerly agreeing ones, we can reject the
null hypothesis of no diﬀerence for all stages. For the beliefs when the most recently
observed private signal/predecessor’s prediction is diﬀerent from the formerly agreeing
ones, we can reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence for all stages7.T h u s ,w e d e r i v e
the following result.
• Result 3: Subjects’ posterior beliefs reported in 1-CAS are signiﬁcantly higher than
those reported in 6-CAS not only in almost all the cascades stages but also in all
the no-cascades stages.
5D i s c u s s i o n
Results 1 and 2 are consistent with our hypotheses 1 and 2. For Result 2, subjects in
cascades stages of 6-CAS do not extract much information from predecessors’ predictions,
indicating that they recognize other subjects’ cascading behaviors. However, this obser-
vation is not consistent with previous results of similar experiments by Dominitz and
Hung (2004) and Stiehler (2003). The diﬀerence might be due to the fact that our sub-
jects, unlike subjects in those experiments, participated in both 1-CAS and 6-CAS. By
participating in both treatments, our subjects may be aware the diﬀerent informativeness
of private signals and predecessors’ predictions in cascades stages.
Result 3 is consistent with the ﬁrst half and inconsistent with the last half of hy-
pothesis 3. This observation indicates that private signals are more informative than
7In cascades stage 1, the average posterior belief reported in 6-CAS is higher than that in reported
in 1-CAS.
5predecessors’ predictions not only in cascades stages but also in no-cascades stages. This
is clear evidence that subjects distrust other subjects. They might think that information
obtained by my own is more reliable than that obtained via other people’s behaviors even
though both of them have exactly the same informativeness. This would be consistent
with overconﬁdence on private signals which has been pointed out in previous experi-
ments (e.g. Anderson and Holt (1997), Çelen and Kariv (2004), Hung and Plott (2001),
Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004), and Nöth and Weber (2003)).
In addition, we observe that subjects’ posterior beliefs are higher than the hypotheti-
cal posterior probabilities in no-cascades stage 1, but they are lower than the hypothetical
posteriors in all the other stages. This observation indicates that human subjects cannot
estimate posterior beliefs precisely in a Bayesian way even in 1-CAS where Bayesian up-
dating seems to be done relatively easily. The observation that subjects in no-cascades
stage 1 overestimate posterior beliefs is consistent with the anchoring and adjustment
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). We argue that when the actual Bayesian posterior
is 0.5, subjects’ estimation would be anchored by the most recently observed private sig-
nals/predecessors’ predictions and be adjusted by the formerly observed ones. However,
since adjustments tend to be insuﬃcient as Tversky and Kahneman (1974) pointed out,
they would overestimate posterior beliefs. The observation that subjects in all the other
stages underestimate posterior beliefs is consistent with the conservatism (e.g., Edwards
(1968)). We argue that when the actual Bayesian posteriors are more than 0.5, subjects
would not extract enough information from the observed private signals/predecessors’
predictions and would underestimate posterior beliefs8.
8In cascades stages of 6-CAS when the most recently observed private signals/predecessors’ predictions
are same as the formerly agreeing ones, posterior beliefs lie about the lower bound of the hypothetical
posterior probabilities. This would happen if subjects in nondecision stage t +1think that subjects
in decision stage t observe the diﬀerent private signals from the formerly agreeing predecessors’ predic-
tions. However, this would be less realistic since Pr(σA,σA,σA|A)=0 .30 > Pr(σA,σA,σB|A)=0 .15,
for example. Thus, we argue that subjects in these stages tend to underestimate Bayesian posterior
probabilities, although their posteriors are justiﬁed by Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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7Tables and Figures
Table 1: Hypothetical posterior probabilities and subjects’ average posterior beliefs
reported in no-cascades stages
No-casc. Sequence of Hypothetical prob. Subjects’ beliefs
stages signals/predictions 1-CAS 6-CAS 1-CAS 6-CAS
1 AB, BA, ABAB, ABBA, BAAB, BABA 0.5 0.5 0.56 0.51
A, B, ABB, ABA, BAB, BAA,
2 ABABB, ABABA, ABBAB, ABBAA, 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.59
BAABB, BAABA, BABAB, BABAA
3 AA, BB, ABAA, ABBB, BAAA, BABB 0.8 0.8 0.69 0.64
Table 2: Hypothetical posterior probabilities and subjects’ average posterior beliefs
reported in cascades stages: When the most recently observed signal/prediction is
same as the formerly agreeing ones
Casc. Sequence of Hypothetical prob. Subjects’ beliefs
stages signals/predictions 1-CAS 6-CAS 1-CAS 6-CAS
AAA, BBB, ABAAA,
1 ABBBB, BAAAA, BABBB 0.89 [0.67,0.89] 0.79 0.66
2 AAAA, BBBB 0.94 [0.67,0.89] 0.81 0.72
3 AAAAA, BBBBB 0.97 [0.67,0.89] 0.87 0.70
Table 3: Hypothetical posterior probabilities and subjects’ average posterior beliefs
reported in cascades stages: When the most recently observed signal/prediction is
diﬀerent from the formerly agreeing ones
Casc. Sequence of Hypothetical prob. Subjects’ beliefs
Stages signals/predictions 1-CAS 6-CAS 1-CAS 6-CAS
AAB, BBA, ABAAB,
1 ABBBA, BAAAB, BABBA 0.67 0.67 0.51 0.56
2 AAAB, BBBA 0.8 0.67 0.67 0.58
3 AAAAB, BBBBA 0.89 0.67 0.68 0.59
8Table 4: Results of the Spearman’s rank correlation test
Treatment Stages Obs. Spearman’s rho Prob>|t|
No-cascades 1036 0.4146 0.00
1-CAS Cascades (same signals/predictions) 281 0.1198 0.0448
Cascades (diﬀerent signals/predictions) 249 0.2921 0.00
No-cascade 876 0.2424 0.00
6-CAS Cascades (same signal/predictions) 389 0.0822 0.1055
Cascades (diﬀerent signal/predictions) 140 0.0366 0.6932
Table 5: Results of the Mann—Whitney test of diﬀerence
in beliefs reported in 1-CAS and 6-CAS:
When the most recently observed signal/prediction is same as the formerly agreeing ones
No-cascades stage Cascades stage
1 2 3 1 2 3
Z 2.87 3.75 3.87 5.43 3.24 2.63
Prob>|Z| 0.0041 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0012 0.0085
Table 6: Results of the Mann—Whitney test of diﬀerence
in beliefs reported in 1-CAS and 6-CAS:
When the most recently observed signal/prediction is
diﬀerent from the formerly agreeing ones
Cascades stage
1 2 3
Z -2.36 1.92 1.61
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Figure 1: Subjects’ average posterior beliefs in 1-CAS: When the most recently
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Figure 2: Subjects’ average posterior beliefs in 1-CAS: When the most recently
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Figure 3: Subjects’ average posterior beliefs in 6-CAS: When the most recently
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Figure 4: Subjects’ average posterior beliefs in 6-CAS: When the most recently
observed signal/prediction is diﬀerent from the formerly agreeing ones
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